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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 11-1419 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES HOGAN 
a/k/a SNAP 
 
CHARLES HOGAN, 
       Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-06-cr-00537-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 29, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Charles Hogan was convicted and sentenced in the District Court of conspiracy to 
distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and 
2 
 
possession of five or more kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  He contends that the Court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing.  We disagree, and thus affirm.
1
 
I. 
As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  After his arrest, Hogan retained Joseph Santaguida to represent him.  The 
Government filed a notice pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 that identified two prior felony 
drug convictions, increasing the statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment 
from ten years to life imprisonment.  Hogan entered into a plea agreement with the 
Government, in exchange for which the Government agreed to dismiss the Section 851 
notice and file an amended notice charging only one prior felony conviction, reducing the 
statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment to twenty years. 
At the change-of-plea hearing, Hogan was represented by Brian McQuigan, an 
attorney who worked in Santaguida‟s law firm.  At the hearing, Hogan stated that he was 
satisfied with McQuigan‟s representation, that he had ample time to discuss his case and 
plea agreement with McQuigan, that he understood the terms and conditions of the plea 
agreement, and that he was guilty.  He also confirmed that he understood the mandatory 
minimum sentence, and that the District Court could impose a sentence less or more 
severe than the United States Sentencing Guidelines‟ advisory range.  The plea 
agreement accurately states the mandatory minimum sentence, and confirms that Hogan 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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was satisfied with his counsel‟s representation and had not been promised or guaranteed 
what sentence the Court would impose.   
Less than a week before the scheduled sentencing date,
2
 Hogan filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, contending that he did not have adequate opportunity to review 
the plea agreement and was provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  He argued that 
counsel was ineffective because (1) he was represented at the change-of-plea hearing by 
an attorney who worked in his retained counsel‟s office but who was not his retained 
counsel, (2) this “substitute counsel” led him to believe that he could be sentenced to less 
than twenty years‟ imprisonment and that the plea agreement would reduce his 
mandatory minimum sentence, and (3) this “substitute counsel” failed to challenge the 
amended Section 851 notice.  After being advised that Hogan did not wish to testify in 
support of his motion, the District Court denied the motion without conducting a hearing.   
II. 
The District Court‟s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to 
sentencing is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 
(3d Cir. 2003).  The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a “fair and just reason” 
for withdrawing the plea.  Id.  This burden is substantial:  “A shift in defense tactics, a 
change of mind, or the fear of punishment are not adequate reasons to impose on the 
                                              
2
 In the interim, Hogan sent two letters to the District Court.  The first requested new 
counsel, which the Court appointed.  The second stated that the stipulation in the plea 
agreement as to the quantity of cocaine included cocaine for which he was not 
responsible.  Regardless of the quantity of cocaine for which Hogan was responsible, 
taking into account the amended Section 851 notice citing one prior felony drug 
conviction, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment was twenty years. 
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government the expense, difficulty, and risk of trying a defendant who has already 
acknowledged his guilt by pleading guilty.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 250 
F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
We consider three factors in evaluating whether to grant a withdrawal: 
“(1) whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength of the defendant‟s 
reasons for withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced 
by the withdrawal.”  Id.  As to the first factor, “[o]nce a defendant has pleaded guilty, he 
„must then not only reassert innocence, but give sufficient reasons to explain why 
contradictory positions were taken before the district court and why permission should be 
given to withdraw the guilty plea and reclaim the right to trial.‟”  Id. at 253 (quoting 
United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992)).  A defendant is permitted to 
withdraw a plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel only upon showing that “his 
attorney‟s advice was under all the circumstances unreasonable under prevailing 
professional norms,” and that “he suffered „sufficient prejudice‟ from his counsel‟s 
errors.”  Id. at 253-54 (quoting United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 45 (3d Cir. 1992)).  If 
the defendant does not demonstrate sufficient grounds for withdrawing the plea, the 
Government is not required to show prejudice.  United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 
116 (3d Cir. 1986).           
Not only did Hogan not assert his innocence,
3
 but his other reasons do not provide 
a valid basis for withdrawing his plea.  The plea agreement and Hogan‟s testimony at the 
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 Hogan argues that our requirement that a defendant assert his or her innocence and 
explain contradictory positions taken in the prior proceedings goes beyond the “fair and 
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change-of-plea hearing contradict his assertions that he did not have an adequate 
opportunity to review the plea agreement, that he was prejudiced by McGuigan‟s 
representation, and that he was led to believe that he would receive less than a twenty-
year sentence and the plea agreement would reduce his mandatory minimum sentence.  
Moreover, even if McGuigan inaccurately stated the potential sentence and otherwise 
provided less able legal representation than that which would have been provided by 
Santaguida, Hogan was not prejudiced by this representation.   
Finally, the amended Section 851 notice identifies Hogan‟s 1988 conviction for a 
felony drug offense as his only prior felony conviction.  Section 851 precludes any 
challenge to the validity of a prior conviction that occurred more than five years before 
the date of the information alleging the prior conviction.  21 U.S.C. § 851(e).  The 
amended Section 851 notice reduced Hogan‟s mandatory minimum sentence from life 
imprisonment to twenty years.  There was no reason for Hogan‟s counsel to challenge the 
amended notice.     
*    *    *    *    * 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hogan‟s motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing.  Thus we affirm. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
just reason” standard of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.  Though we previously held that an assertion 
of innocence is not necessarily a prerequisite to the withdrawal of a plea, we later stated 
that a defendant must assert his or her innocence.  See, e.g., Jones, 979 F.2d at 318; 
United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 n.5 (3d Cir. 1969).  We do not need to 
address this issue, however, because, even absent an assertion of innocence, Hogan has 
failed to provide a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing his plea. 
